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Foreword 
This article by Arnulf Grubler, Michael Jefferson, and Neboj§a Nakicenovic 
summarizes a major study on long-term energy perspectives conducted jointly 
by IIASA and the World Energy Council (WEC). The study combines 
IIASA's long-standing analytical work in energy systems analysis and our 
examinations of more recent global change issues, on the one hand, with the 
perspectives and outreach capabilities of the WEC, a distinguished industry 
body, on the other. The product of this fruitful collaboration, Global Energy 
Perspectives to 2050 and Beyond, summarized here, was presented at the 
16th World Energy Congress held in Tokyo, October 1995, to an audience 
of some 5000 energy executives and policymakers. 
The study examines the implications of alternative scenarios of energy 
development up to the year 2050, and for some issues, most notably possible 
climate change, until the end of the 21st century. Given the obvious inherent 
uncertainties about the future, such a long time scale requires the customary 
disclaimer that scenarios are not forecasts or predictions but rather inter-
nally consistent "stories" of possible ways the future may unfold. The long 
lead times needed for planning and the longevity of the infrastructure and 
the capital stock of the energy sector, as well as possible long-term environ-
mental impacts, require that the world not rely on real-time experimenta-
tion and "discovery by accident." Policymakers must be informed about the 
possible longer-term implications and the impacts of near-term actions and 
investment decisions and how resilient they are in a range of plausible future 
developments. 
The joint IIASA- WEC study has identified patterns that appear robust 
under a wide range of possible future developments. The study relates near-
term decisions to longer-term possible divergence of energy systems struc-
tures, which is important especially for R&D and technology policy. The 
joint IIASA-WEC study addresses an audience much wider than the imme-
diate constituencies of both institutions. We are pleased that our successful 
cooperation will continue. Indeed, further results of our collaboration are 
scheduled for presentation at the 1998 World Energy Congress in Houston. 
lll 
Peter E. de Jdnosi 
Director 
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ABSTRACT 
This article reports a study on Global Energy Perspectives to 2050 and Beyond conducted jointly by the 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) and the World Energy Council (WEC). All together 
three cases of economic and energy developments were developed that sprawl into six scenarios of energy supply 
alternatives extending until the end of the 21st century. The internal consistency of the scenarios was assessed 
with the help of formal energy models . The study took close account of world populat ion prospects, economic 
growth, technological advance , the energy resource base, environmental implications from the local to the global 
level, financing requirements, and the future prospects of both fossil and non fossil fuels and industries. Although 
no analysis can turn an uncertain future into a sure thing, the study identifies patterns that are robust across a 
purposely broad range of scenarios . The study also enables to relate alternative near-term research and develop-
ment, technology, economic, and environmental policies to the possible long-term divergence of energy systems 
structures. Due to the long lead times involved in the turnover of capital stock and infrastructures of the energy 
system, policies would need to be implemented now in order to initiate long-term structural changes in the energy 
system that would, however, become significant only after the year 2020. 
Introduction 
This article summarizes a study of long-term energy prospects conducted jointly by 
the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) and the World Energy 
Council (WEC). The study report, Global Energy Perspectives to 2050 and Beyond [1] , 
was presented at the 16th WEC Congress in Tokyo, October 1995. 
The study is based on the formulation of alternative scenarios, corroborated by an 
integrated assessment framework of energy-environmental models under development at 
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TABLE 1 
Summary for Three Cases in 2050 and 2100 
Case 
A B c 
High growth Middle course Ecologically driven 
Population in I09 
2050 IO.I JO. I IO. I 
2100 11.7 11.7 11.7 
GWP in 1012$ 
2050 JOO 75 75 
2100 300 200 220 
Energy intensity decline Medium Low High 
PE/GDP, 11/o / yr 
World (1990-2050) - 1.0 -0.7 -1.4 
World (1990- 2100) - 1.0 -0.8 -1.5 
Primary energy demand , Gtoe 
2050 25 20 14 
2100 45 35 21 
Resource availability 
Fossil High Medium Low 
Non fossil High Medium High 
Technology costs 
Fossil Low Medium High 
Non fossil Low Medium Low 
Technology dynamics 
Fossil High Medium Medium 
Non fossil High Medium High 
CO, emission constraint No No Yes 
Carbon emissions , GtC 
2050 9-15 IO 
2100 7-22 14 2 
En vironmental taxes No No Yes 
Number of scenarios 3 I 2 
See Appendix 2 for abbreviations. 
IIASA (for an overview see the Appendix I on methodology). The 1993 WEC Commission 
report, Energy for Tomorrow's World [2), outlined global energy perspectives and related 
issues in some detail to the year 2020. The Commission report's broader outline to 2100 
served as a starting point for the analysis reported here. 
Cases/ Scenarios 
Three alternative cases of long-term economic and energy development were used 
to explore alternative possible futures. The cases are labeled A (high growth), B (middle 
course), and C (ecologically driven). The key features are summarized in Table I. In the 
early stages of the study, it became apparent that it was necessary to move beyond the 
formulation of three alternative cases. More possibilities opened up than anticipated 
originally, and the three cases blossomed into six scenarios of energy supply systems 
alternatives . Three variants of Case A (Scenarios Al, A2 and A3) and two variants of 
Case C (Scenarios Cl and C2) were developed. For the middle course Case B, only one 
scenario was developed as it was designed to represent a future characterized by incremen-
tal and gradual changes. 
The three cases have a number of common features : 
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• World population grows in line with current medium projections by the World 
Bank, United Nations, and IIASA to about 10 billion in 2050 and approaching 
12 billion in 2100. It was felt that no useful purpose would be served in using 
high and low projection alternatives, particularly as these alternatives would divert 
attention from the main, energy-oriented thrust of the study. The World Bank's 
estimates have, therefore, been used. 
• The world is divided into 11 regions (Figure 1 ), defined on the basis of geographical 
proximity, and similarity of economic and energy systems patterns. Most of the 
results are reported for three macro-regions: the transitional economies of the 
Former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe (labeled REFs), the current 
developing countries (DCs), and the industrialized countries of the Organization 
of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
• Social and economic development is substantial, particularly in the South. During 
the next century, the current distinction between developing and developed coun-
tries will become inappropriate as affluence increases throughout the world. 
• Energy efficiency improvements are steady and considerable but not too far out 
of line with historic experience. Evidence from the past decade suggests modest 
expectations are justified until proven otherwise. 
• The quantity and quality of energy services grows steadily as the drive for cleaner 
and more convenient fuels continues. 
• Formal top-down and bottom-up models have been used to check for internal 
consistency of the scenarios. 
The differences between the cases and their scenarios may be summarized as follows: 
Case A- High Growth 
Case A assumes high rates of economic growth and technological progress, a liberal 
international trading regime, and preference for markets rather than detailed regulation. 
Economic growth is some 2% per annum in OECD countries and double that figure in 
developing countries. This relatively high growth facilitates rapid turnover of capital 
stock and shifts in economic structures, which promotes efficiency improvements and 
technological advance. Toward the end of the 21st century, average global per capita 
income in Case A would surpass the highest national levels observed today, indicating that 
current categorizations between developed and developing regions will become obsolete. 
As indicated, Case A is three pronged with respect to possible alternative energy 
systems developments: 
• Al labeled clean fossils favors neither coal nor nuclear, but as a result of technologi-
cal change sees the tapping of the vast potential of conventional and unconven-
tional oil and gas resources. As a result, fossil fuel resources are sufficient to allow 
a smooth transition to alternative supply sources based on acceptable nuclear and 
new renewables, matched with high quality energy carriers in the form of electricity, 
liquids, gas and-later-hydrogen. Coal is regarded as a relatively unattractive 
backstop fossil fuel and continuously loses market share. 
• A2 is labeled dirty fossils. For a variety of reasons, concerns about potential 
climate change wither away, and coal's vast resources make it the fossil fuel of 
choice as conventional oil and gas resources dwindle. Local and regional sulphur 
and nitrogen emissions are controlled through add-on technologies; however, chal-
lenges continue as coal is exploited at ever deeper and more remote locations, and 
conversion to synliquids is increasingly required. 
OECD 
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Fig. 1. llASA and WEC study 11 world regions. Abbreviations: 1- NAM = North America, 2- LAM = Latin America and the Caribbean, 3-WEU = Western 
Europe, 4-EEU = Central and Eastern Europe, 5-FSU = Former Soviet Union, 6-MEA = Middle East and North Africa, 7-AFR = Sub-Saharan Africa, 8-
CPA = Centrally Planned Asia and China, 9-SAS = South Asia, 10-PAS = Other Pacific Asia, 11-PAO = Pacific OECD. 
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• A3 is labeled bio-nuc. Large-scale renewables and a new generation of nuclear 
power lead to a technology-driven transition to a post-fossil fuel (l.ge. The transition 
parallels history as industrialized countries moved from fuelwood through coal 
to oil and natural gas. In this scenario, natural gas is the transitional fossil fuel 
of choke, supported by economically competitive oil resources. There is little 
pressure to exploit nonconventional oil resources or large volumes of cqal. By 2100, 
there is almost equal reliance on nuclear energy, natural gas, modern biomass, and 
a fourth category composed mostly of solar energy with smaller contributions 
from wind, geothermal, and a few ocean/tidal schemes. 
Case B-Middle Course 
Case B is a single scenario, with more modest assumptions about economic growth, 
technological development, removal of trade barriers, and satisfaction of the development 
aspirations of the South than in Case A. Recent setbacks and slower economic restructur-
ing than anticipated for the transitional economies, together with weak economic perfor-
mance in sub-Saharan Africa and some other developing countries, are also reflected in 
the comparatively modest near-term economic growth assumptions of Case B. 
This case has the greatest reliance on fossil fuels of any scenario except the coal-
intensive Scenario A2. Beyond 2020, the failure to match depleting fossil fuel resources 
with the necessary technological advances and exploration and production effort creates 
challenges for energy supply structures. There is pressure to move into costlier categories 
of unconventional resources and more remote conventional resources of fossil fuels; 
financial and environmental constraints loom increasingly large. 
This scenario may be seen as more realistic or a case of muddling through. 
Case C- Ecologically Driven 
Case C is the most ambitious by being highly optimistic about technology diffusion 
and geopolitical innovations to meet the challenges of the environment and international 
equity. Substantial resource transfers from North to South recycle environmental taxes 
to spur growth in the South enabling wide participation in international environmental 
agreements and policies to reduce emissions from energy supply and end use. Globally, 
economic growth falls short of Case A but slightly surpasses that of Case B, allowing 
a substantial reduction in economic disparities. Case C incorporates policies that reduce 
carbon emissions to 2 GtC (gigatonnes carbon) by the end of the 21st century. These 
can either be achieved through economic instruments or effective command and control 
measures. Model checks confirm that the latter could create inefficiencies. It is believed 
that incentives rather than taxes - carrots rather than sticks - are more likely to get organi-
zations and individuals to respond positively and quickly. 
In Case C, nuclear energy is at a crossroads illustrated by two scenarios. Scenario 
Cl assumes nuclear energy is a transient technology that is phased out entirely in the 
long-term, leaving new renewable forms of energy to substitute for fossil fuels. Scenario 
C2 assumes a new generation of small-scale (200 to 400 MW) nuclear reactors is developed 
which is, and is also perceived to be, inherently safe. 
Each of these six scenarios covers the energy system as a whole from resource extrac-
tion to the provision of energy services. They are not simply energy supply or energy 
demand scenarios. 
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Key Underlying Elements 
This summary cannot reproduce the richness of detail contained in the full study 
[l], but five salient elements are summarized here: 
• population prospects; 
• economic growth; 
• energy intensity; 
• technological advance; and 
• the energy resource base. 
To the industrialization process, which continues in many countries, have been added 
four further structural transformations: 
• urbanization; 
• the transition from noncommercial to commercial forms of energy; 
• more convenient, cleaner, and flexible forms of energy-essentially increased qual-
ity; and 
• decreasing energy intensity (the specific energy needs per unit of economic activity 
decline with economic development). 
These transformations began in the most developed parts of the world and have 
spread globally, but there remain significant differences between regions. Such structural 
shifts are generally least advanced in developing countries where population is expected 
to grow rapidly. 
Population Prospects 
A single medium projection of the world's population was assumed in the study 
(Figure 2) [3]. World population is expected to double in 70 years from 1990 to 10.6 
billion in 2060. The last doubling took approximately 40 years. That means population 
growth is slowing, but the absolute increases will be larger than ever before. 
Most of this growth will occur in the present developing countries, termed the South. 
Not only will the energy consumption balance have shifted from North to South, the 
geopolitical balance may also have shifted in this direction. 
The rate of urbanization will be even faster than the rate of population growth 
overall. Most of the largest cities of the world will be in the South. Highly urbanized 
populations have relatively high per capita energy consumption levels (they also have 
relatively high income levels). In the Ecologically Driven Case C, urbanization is assumed 
to proceed at a somewhat slower rate than in the other two cases because locally appro-
priate, small-scale new renewable sources of energy become available to rural communities 
and slow the urbanization process. 
Economic Growth 
The economic growth assumptions to 2050, by case and by region, are given in Table 
2, placed in their historical context since 1850. Historical experience indicates both an 
uneven process across countries and over time, and a certain degree of convergence as 
less developed economies "catch up" with more developed ones. As a result, the scenarios 
assume that all countries and regions eventually achieve a take-off into accelerated eco-
nomic development and industrialization, and conditional convergence in long-term levels 
of economic development. 
The study develops further the calculation of economic growth based not simply on 
gross domestic product calculated at market exchange rates (GDP mer), but also calculated 
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Fig. 2. World population, 1850 to 1990, and World Bank projection to 2100 (3), rural-urban (top) 
and by macroregion (bottom), in billion (109) people. Urbanization trends are based on UN [4) and 
Berry (5). 
at purchasing power parities (GDPppp). Purchasing power parities give a more accurate 
representation of the relative level of economic activities for economies that do not have a 
free market for foreign currency exchange. Furthermore, it does not assume that domestic 
prices (e.g., for food in developing countries) are similar to international prices. Use of 
GDPPPP modifies somewhat the wide disparities in income, wealth, and consumption 
around the world. By the GDPmec measure, the richest 20% of the world's population 
produce and consume 80% of the world's product; by the GDP PPP measure, the richest 200Jo 
consume "only" 60% . The distinction becomes particularly important when considering 
energy intensity differences among regions. 
Energy Intensity 
Energy intensity is a broad aggregate measure, linking energy consumption to units 
of economic activity. Energy intensities have tended to decline, in the United States and 
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TABLE 2 
Economic Growth Rates, Historical and 1990 to 2050 (OJo/yr) 
Region 
NAM 
WEU 
PAO 
EEU 
FSU 
CPA 
SAS 
PAS 
MEA 
AFR 
LAM 
World 
Since 
1850 
3.5 
2.4 
3.9 
2.1 
3.5 
2.9 
2.0 
NA 
NA 
NA 
3.7 
NA 
Historical 
mer 
Since 
1950 
3.3 
3.7 
6.2 
3.9 
5.2 
6.1 
4.5 
9.8 
4.6 
2.7 
4.2 
2.9 
PPP 
Since 1990-2020 
1950 A B 
2.1 2.3 2.0 
2.2 2.2 1.9 
3.6 1.9 1.5 
2.4 2.3 0.9 
3.5 1.2 0.7 
4.3 7.2 5.0 
3.1 3.9 3.6 
6.8 5.7 4.4 
3.1 3.6 3.3 
2.0 3.3 3.0 
2.9 3.1 3.0 
2.0 2.7 2.2 
Historical data sources [6, 7]. See Appendix 2 for abbreviations. 
Case 
2020-2050 
c A B c 
1.7 1.6 1.4 I.I 
1.7 1.6 1.3 I.I 
1.4 1.2 0.9 0.8 
1.3 4.6 3.6 3.2 
I.I 5.4 3.8 3.3 
6.7 4.4 4.0 4.0 
3.7 4.6 3.5 4.3 
5.3 3.3 3.1 3.1 
3.2 3.9 3.0 3.0 
3.1 4.7 3.5 3.9 
2.8 3.2 2.8 2.6 
2.2 2.6 2.0 2.1 
the United Kingdom, for instance, for some 125 to 150 years if total energy (noncommer-
cial and commercial energy combined) is taken into account. If only commercial energy 
is considered, in the United States, for example, the decline in energy intensity is post-
poned- until about 1920. Figure 3 provides historic changes in primary energy intensity 
for total energy (solid lines) and commercial energy only (dotted lines) for selected coun-
tries. For developing and reforming economies, both GDP measures (at market exchange 
rates and at purchasing power parities) are provided. Thus, India's total energy intensity 
has been declining quite sharply based on GDPmer, but remains much higher than the 
more stable evolution at GDPPPP· Commercial energy intensity, on the other hand, is 
rising sharply on both GDP measures. 
It is assumed in the study that aggregate energy intensities generally improve over 
time but take account of the impact of commercial energy carriers substituting for tradi-
tional energy forms and technologies. Once that process is largely complete, commercial 
energy intensities decrease in line with the pattern found for aggregate energy intensities 
in industrialized economies. There are, of course, persistent differences between countries , 
and these reflect a range of historical circumstances, development histories , and pricing 
and cultural patterns, including attitudes toward technology. Historically, energy intensity 
improvements tend to be path dependent, leading only to conditional convergence between 
countries and regions over time, a hypothesis that is also incorporated into the scenarios 
presented here. 
The resulting global energy intensity improvement rates are 1.00Jo per annum for 
high growth case A, 0.80/o per annum for middle course Case B, and 1.4% per annum 
for economically driven Case C. Fuller details are given in Tables 3 and 4. 
In comparing the energy intensity improvement rates presented here with other studies 
and earlier WEC cases, important definitional and measurement issues have to be kept 
in mind. These measurement issues are illustrated below for Case B (middle course) for 
three of our 11 world regions, giving energy intensity improvement rates (percent per 
year) to 2020 for total primary energy (TPE) and commercial primary energy (CPE), 
and for market exchange rate GDPmer and purchasing power GDPPPP• respectively . 
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Fig. 3. Primary energy intensity for selected countries, total and commercial energy in kgoe per 
US(1990)$ GDPm., and GDP,,,. Source: (8-10). 
TABLE 3 
Three Scenarios of Energy Intensity Improvements (primary energy per GDP""' OJo / yr) 
Case 
A B c Bl-C' 
1990-2050 1990-2050 1990-2050 1990-2020 
OECD -1.2 -1.1 -2.0 -1.9 -2.8' 
REFs -2.1 -1.7 -2.2 -1.2 -2.7' 
DCs -1.6 -1.2 -1.9 -0.8 -2.1' 
World -1.0 -0.8 - 1.4 -1.3 -2.4' 
•Range of WEC Commission's Report on Energy for Tomorrow's World [2] . Improvement rates not directly 
comparable as based on purchasing power parity. It should be emphasized that the WEC Commission specifically 
rejected adoption of any business-as-usual cases and noted that in recent years groups of industrialized countries 
have achieved overall energy intensity reductions exceeding l.50Jo per year (e.g_., the European Union since 1974) 
and exceeding 2.50Jo per year if road transportation is excluded. But what can be achieved by a few countries 
over a relatively short period and what can be achieved by many over a long period may be two very different 
things. 
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The dynamics of energy intensity improvements change drastically for developing 
regions as exemplified by centrally planned Asia and China and sub-Saharan Africa. The 
generally higher energy intensity improvements for centrally planned Asia and China are 
the result of the much higher short-term economic growth rates for centrally planned 
Asia and China than sub-Saharan Africa; higher GDP growth leading to faster turnover 
of capital stock yields faster energy intensity improvements in the scenarios. Thus, the 
evolution of the total primary energy consumption per GDP mer yields a challenging numeri-
cal magnitude of energy intensity improvements. Conversely, commercial energy intensity 
measured per GPDPPP assume positive values, i.e., commercial energy consumption grows 
at least as fast as GDPPPP in Case B. 
Technological Advance 
The full report [I] devotes considerable space to the dynamics of technical progress 
and to technological innovation and diffusion drawing on IIASA's data bank of 1,400 
technologies. Technological change, together with economic structural change, is an im-
portant driving force for the evolution of energy intensity. 
The three cases assume different rates of technological progress and learning, and 
the varying impact of related features such as the relevance of international trade require-
ments for some technologies and the scope for local development and manufacture of 
others. In all cases, energy options not technically feasible today are excluded. Nuclear 
fusion, for example, is excluded. Hydrogen as an energy carrier is included, because it 
can be produced with current technologies, though not at current commercial costs. 
In Case A (high growth), there is substantial advance in all new energy production, 
conversion, and end-use technologies. These advances are demonstrated across the board: 
for hydrocarbon exploration and extraction, nuclear electricity generation and hydrogen, 
renewable sources of electricity generation and biofuel production and conversion, and 
for advanced end-use conversion technologies such as fuel cells. 
In Case B (middle course), the advances are less substantial than in Case A, reflecting 
less concerted research, development, and diffusion efforts. In Case B, technological 
change largely focuses on incremental improvements of existing technologies. 
Case C (ecologically driven) strongly favors low-carbon fossil and renewable energy 
supply and high efficiency end-use technologies. Technologies in these sectors benefit 
from improvements rates equal to those in Case A. Technological developments in other 
energy sectors develop more slowly, as in Case B. 
Energy Resource Base 
The resource base used for the study includes all potentially recoverable coal, conven-
tional oil and natural gas, unconventional oil (shale, tar sands and heavy crudes), and 
unconventional natural gas (gas in Devonian shale, tight sand formations, geopressurized 
aquifers and coal seams). Quantities not considered potentially recoverable are classified 
TABLE 4 
Energy Intensity Improvements 1990-2020 for Three Regions (%/yr) 
Region TPE/ GDPm., TPE/ GDP,,, CPE/ GDPm., 
NAM -1.2 -1.3 -1.2 
CPA -2.2 -0.7 - 1.5 
SAS -1.0 -0.3 0.2 
See Appendix 2 for abbreviations. 
CPE/ GDP,,, 
-1.3 
0.0 
0.8 
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TABLE 5 
Global Fossil and Nuclear Energy Reserves, Resources, and Occurrences (in Gtoe) 
Consumption Resource 
1850-1990 1990 Reserves Resources• base• 
Oil 
Conventional 90 3.2 150 145 295 
Unconventional 193 332 525 
Natural gas 
Conventional 41 1.7 141 279 420 
Unconventional 192 258 450 
Hydrates 
Coal 125 2.2 606 2,794 3,400 
Total' 256 7.0 1,282 3,808 5,090 
Uranium 17 0.5 57 203 260 
in FBRsd 3,390 12, 150 15,550 
Source: [I] . Dash in place of entry signifies negligible amounts; blanks, data not available . 
0 Resources to be discovered or developed to reserves. 
• Resource base is the sum of reserves and resources. 
' All totals have been rounded. 
d Fast breeder reactors. 
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Additional 
occurrences 
1,900 
400 
18,700 
3,000 
24,000 
150 
8,900 
as additional occurrences and are excluded from the resource base. Hence, they are not 
taken into account in the cases/scenarios presented here. The quantities of such occur-
rences as methane hydrates in tundra regions and in the sea, and natural uranium dissolved 
in sea water, are huge. Table 5 provides the details. (Numerous sources have been drawn 
on in building up Table 5, including IIASA and WEC, which are acknowledged in the 
full study (l].) 
The availability of the fossil fuel and uranium resource base varies across the cases 
and scenarios. It ranges from optimistic in Case A (Scenarios Al and A3), through 
cautious (Scenario A2 and Case B), to conservative (Case C). As mentioned previously, 
additional occurrences are not utilized in any of the scenarios, but they do indicate the 
hypothetical availability of enormous quantities. 
The fossil fuel resource figures given in Table 5 are certainly sufficient for more than 
100 years, even in the highest Case A scenarios. This is not to suggest that temporary 
or structural energy shortages cannot occur- simply there are no basic geological con-
straints. There are likely to be other barriers to using such large quantities of fossil energy: 
technical, financial, and environmental. For instance, cumulative carbon emissions of 
the full exploitation of fossil resources would correspond to six to seven times the current 
atmospheric C02 concentration, which now approaches 360 ppmv (parts per million by 
volume) . Local environmental impacts could also be chronic in many parts of the world 
(see discussion below). 
The use of uranium in the future will depend in part on the resolution of current 
controversies surrounding operational safety, waste disposal, and proliferation; and in 
part on the successful development of new technologies. 
Renewable energy resources (with the exception of a few hydropower sites) offer 
much lower energy densities than the fossil fuels. They are limited, therefore, not by the 
magnitude of their energy flows (that are huge by any standards) but by how these flows 
can be harnessed and converted to fuels to provide energy services. This implies not only 
appropriate technology and finance, but also the resolution of potential local environmen-
tal impacts. 
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Nevertheless, it is also a fact that the Earth annually intercepts about 130,000 Otoe 
(gigaton oil equivalent) of solar energy compared with current total global energy con-
sumption of about 9 Otoe. This is one reason why it is not unlikely that, in the long 
run, the more direct uses of solar energy from photovoltaics to solar thermal will account 
for the major part of renewable energy. A second reason is that other forms of renewable 
energy may have either unacceptable local environmental impacts when pursued on a large 
scale (plantation biomass) or when pursued in particular locations (beautiful landscapes, 
sensitive estuaries, rare natural habitats). 
The key issue, therefore, is what fraction of renewable energy flows can and will 
be harnessed for the energy purposes of future generations of people. The WEC's reports, 
Energy for Tomorrow's World [2] and New Renewable Energy Resources: A Guide to 
the Future [11], identified renewable energy potentials by the year 2100 of up to 13 Otoe, 
of which 10 Otoe could be supplied by new renewables-modern biomass, solar, wind, 
geothermal, ocean/tidal, and small hydropower (under 10 MW). 
Progress towards that longer-term potential is, however, likely to be slow- particu-
larly with current policies. Major, effective, and internationally coordinated policy sup-
port would be required if developments are to be accelerated over the next two or three 
decades. In the longer term, nevertheless, the potentials for renewables increase signifi-
cantly as technology and both absolute and relative cost improvements take place in 
the scenarios. 
Prospects for Energy Systems 
The energy system is service driven from the bottom up, whereas energy flows are 
resource and conversion process driven from the top down. Energy flows from energy 
sources to end use, and driving forces from population growth to technological change, 
interact intimately. In the study, therefore, the dichotomy between supply and demand 
has been replaced with the broader perspective foreshadowed in the WEC's report, Energy 
for Tomorrow's World: 
The energy community is the captive of its own technology in continuing to use these distinctive terms 
in ways which fail to recognise them as elements of .. . a system which should be driven not by the 
exigencies of primary energy supply, trade or the energy market but by the end-point services which energy 
is the means of providing [2, p. 246] . 
The scenarios here are, therefore, described in terms of primary and final energy 
consumption. Primary energy depicts the structure of energy extraction and conversion, 
whereas final energy shows the structure of energy end use. 
The six scenarios are intended to illustrate the possibilities arising out of steps taken 
to develop new energy technologies, energy resources, and financial institutions over a 
time period, guided by policy and end-use objectives that permit a range of outcomes. 
There is also time to achieve capital turnover and fundamental change in the energy 
system. By 2020, many current energy end-use devices will have been replaced by those just 
being introduced for commercial use today or those on the near horizon-new vehicles, 
industrial processes and heating systems, and parts of the housing stock and infrastruc-
tures. Many power plants will have been replaced, and others will be nearing the end of 
their useful lifetimes. The time horizon to 2050 and on to 2100 means that all energy 
technologies and devices are likely to have been replaced at least twice, and most energy 
infrastructures as well. Such turnover offers enormous new supply and end-use opportuni-
ties reflected in the scenarios of the study. 
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Fig. 4. Global primary energy use (Gloe), 1850 to present, and in the three cases to 2100. The insert 
shows global population growth, 1850 to present, and its projection (3) to 2100, in billions (109) of people. 
Primary Energy 
Figure 4 illustrates world primary energy use and world population growth from 
1850 to the present time, together with the six scenarios grouped into three cases, labeled 
A, B, and C. Primary energy requirements of the scenarios within each case are almost 
identical (see Table 6). 
The three cases indicate that global primary energy use would increase up to three-fold 
by 2050, and two- to five-fold by 2100. Case A (high growth) portrays primary energy 
growth rates approaching those of the historical experience since 1850, whereas Cases 
B (middle course) and C (ecologically driven) present substantially lower growth. Case 
C in particular represents a radical change, with emphasis on energy efficiency and conser-
vation that results in a clear decoupling of energy and economic growth. 
The current developing countries account for the overwhelming proportion of the 
increase in global primary energy requirements. Energy demands increase modestly in 
the industrialized North in Case A, grow marginally in Case B, and actually decline in 
Case C. 
Table 6 sets out the basic figures by 2050 for primary energy supply and demand, 
the fuel mix, and final energy demand of the six scenarios. Investment and emissions 
implications are also provided. 
Figures 5 and 6 show the changing primary energy mix of the six scenarios. Figure 
7 provides the cumulative fossil fuel requirements, 1990 to 2050 for the six scenarios. 
Figure 8 shows the converging structure of final energy use of the cases/scenarios. 
Common to all six scenarios is that the peak of the fossil era has passed. Fossil fuel 
consumption will grow more slowly than total primary energy needs. Even in Case A, 
Scenarios Al and A2, the share of fossil energy declines after 2020. The two most im-
portant transitional fuels -oil and natural gas - face declining shares during the next 
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TABLE 6 
Characteristics of Three Cases and Their Six Scenarios for the World in 2050 
Case 
A c 
Al A2 A3 B Cl C2 
Primary energy, in Gtoe 25 25 25 20 14 14 
Primary energy mix, "lo 
Coal 24 32 9 21 II 10 
Oil 30 19 18 20 19 18 
Gas 24 22 32 23 27 24 
Nuclear 6 4 II 14 4 12 
Renewables 16 23 30 22 39 36 
Resource use 1990-2050, in Gtoe 
Coal 235 324 180 226 143 141 
Oil 323 302 284 257 210 210 
Gas 241 247 285 227 210 197 
Energy sector in vestment US$ 10 12 1.2 1.7 1.2 I. I 0.7 0.7 
US$/ toe supplied 50 67 47 56 50 50 
As "lo of GWP" 1.2 1.7 1.2 1.5 0.9 0.9 
Final energy, in Gtoe 17 17 17 14 10 10 
Final energy mix, "lo 
Solids 16 19 18 23 19 20 
Liquids 42 36 33 33 34 34 
Electricity 17 18 18 16 18 17 
Otherb 25 27 31 28 29 29 
Emissions 
Sulfur,'·d MtS 23 86 15 35 4 
Nitrogen," MtN 21 55 21 22 14 12 
"Gross World Product. 
h District heat, gas, and hydrogen. 
"Unabated sulfur emissions in Case A could be three (Al) to five (A2) times higher leading to unacceptable 
local and regional environmental impacts. 
" Preliminary global estimates. 
century. In absolute volumes, however, requirements increase considerably compared to 
current levels. 
The scenarios suggest that the world may now only be one-third of the way through 
the oil age; and one-fifth through the natural gas age. Even the low coal Case C scenarios 
suggest that as much coal will be used between 1990 and 2050 as was used between 1850 
and 1990. Views that these energy scenarios threaten the immediate or early demise of 
oil, gas, or coal are therefore seriously misplaced. 
The three variants of the high growth Case A result in between 1,300 and 2,000 
Gtoe of fossil energy being consumed by 2100, of which oil and gas comprise 900 to 
1,200 Gtoe. This relates to the 1,300 Gtoe fossil reserves figure given in Table 5 and to 
a fossil resources figure of some 3,800 Gtoe. 
In all scenarios, there is also a significant expansion of renewables, but the driving 
forces vary. Case B represents the most cautious assessment of renewables' prospects. 
Over the longer term, however, renewables expand at a steady pace in all scenarios. Even 
in Case B, renewables contribute 22% (4.4 Gtoe) of world primary energy consumption 
by 2050, and 33% (I I Gtoe) by 2100. In Case C and Scenario A3, renewables reach as 
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Gas 
much as 22 Gtoe by 2100, with biomass assumed to contribute over 8 Gtoe, which raises 
doubts about its viability due to competing land uses and local environmental impacts, 
as well as the competitiveness of other energy sources. These issues are discussed in more 
detail in the full report of the study [l]. 
Scenario A3 also requires up to 75 new nuclear reactors per year to 2050, which 
implies that public opinion has become convinced of the safety and general acceptability 
of nuclear power generation. In Scenario C2, nuclear power grows to a market share of 
120Jo worldwide by 2050 and 190Jo by 2100 on the basis of new, small-scale, decentralized 
technologies. In the absence of radical improvements in public acceptability, technology, 
and economics, nuclear energy might prove a transient technology, as illustrated in Sce-
nario Cl. 
Relatively rapid and substantial technological change accompanies the comparatively 
high economic growth and energy requirements of the Case A scenarios. Scenario Al 
assumes that this technological change permits the utilization of large volumes of both 
conventional and nonconventional oil and gas resources, higher energy efficiency, and 
mitigation of most environmental impacts. Fossil fuels still account for about 500Jo of 
primary energy consumption in the year 2100. Scenario A2 is more conservative about 
technological change and resource availability, the main explanation for why this scenario 
is more coal intensive. Scenario A3 is technology intensive, but here new renewable energy 
sources and new nuclear technologies combine to permit the transition to a post-fossil 
age. By 2100 in Scenario A3, fossil fuels account for 300Jo of world primary energy 
consumption; almost all of this is supplied by natural gas. 
The single scenario Case B (middle course) is more cautious with respect to economic 
growth, energy availability and technological change. Fossil fuels still account for about 
450Jo of world primary energy consumption in 2100, but unless rather dramatic changes 
occur to bring in new fossil fuel discoveries or the rapid expansion of non-fossil energy 
sources, resource scarcities become likely. Financing and environmental constraints are 
likely to be particularly severe in this case as more remote and dirty fossil fuel resources 
need to be exploited and converted to synfuels on a large scale. 
The (ecologically driven) Case C scenarios offer the greatest challenges, but also the 
greatest opportunities, as the emphasis shifts to accelerating energy efficiency, encouraging 
energy conservation wherever appropriate, and promoting new, decentralized, and envi-
ronmentally benign technologies. In addition to the vigorous control of local and regional 
pollutants, a global regime to control the emissions of greenhouse gases is established. 
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The goal is to reduce anthropogenic C02 emission levels to 2 GtC by 2100 (corresponding 
to one-third their current level). This is anticipated to lead to eventual stabilization of 
atmospheric C02 concentrations. 
Case C outlines pathways for achieving the transition from the current dominance 
of fossil fuels to the dominance of renewable energy flows. By 2050, renewables account 
for 400Jo of world energy consumption, a share that increases to more than 800Jo by 2100. 
Efficiency and environmental criteria require a high quality of energy carriers delivered 
to end-users. Renewable energy sources are therefore transformed .into electricity, liquid, 
and gaseous energy carriers. Fossil fuels are transitional fuels of rapidly diminishing 
significance. Nuclear energy is at a crossroads in Case C, with new nuclear energy staging 
something of a revival in Scenario C2. In Scenario Cl, nuclear energy is a transient 
technology that becomes virtually phased out by 2100. 
All of the scenarios illustrate an expected drive by consumers for more flexible, more 
convenient, and cleaner final energy forms. 
Final Energy 
Electricity is already an important energy carrier, and its contribution increases in 
all six scenarios. Methanol is also expected to play a larger role in the future. Hydrogen 
is another energy carrier expected- eventually- to play a significant role, but mainly 
post-2050 as considerable time is required to improve its economics and build up a hydro-
gen infrastructure. Overall, the pattern of final energy use is remarkably consistent-
and converging-across all scenarios. 
The most obvious shift is from energy used in its original form - whether traditional 
biomass or coal, etc., - to elaborate systems of energy conversion and delivery. Energy 
delivered by pipelines and networks plays an increasing role. 
There are some important implications for energy efficiency in these shifts and chal-
lenges to traditional conventions and definitions. Hydropower, for instance, is converted 
into electricity at actual efficiencies approaching 900Jo, but a standard convention bases 
the conversion efficiency on the amount of fossil fuel that would have been required to 
produce the same amount of electricity-the substitution method. This reduces hy-
dropower efficiency to an average of 38.50Jo, a definition used by the WEC [2] for all 
nonfossil sources of electricity. The more elaborate energy conversion systems become, 
the more significant this difference is. The conventional accounting approach has been 
used in the study but produces relatively low results with strong implications for renewable 
energy (photovoltaic efficiency is reduced to 180Jo if solar is considered a primary energy 
input, wind energy becomes even more problematic). 
Financial and Environmental Implications 
FINANCING 
The financing requirements of the energy prospects given in all three cases are clearly 
enormous. The problems of financing energy development are already of great concern 
in many developing countries. The growing difficulties in accessing official financial assis-
tance from multilateral bodies, institutional barriers, inappropriate pricing policies, and 
poor investment returns all give cause for concern. Nevertheless, 30Jo to 40Jo of GDP is 
invested in the energy sectors, a ratio that is expected to remain fairly stable; and savings 
rates are about 240Jo on average in developing countries and 200Jo in transitional econo-
mies. Therefore, provided the necessary institutional and pricing adjustments are made, 
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TABLE 7 
Cumulative Investments in Energy Supply by Region, 1990-2020 and 2020-2050 
Case 
A' B c• 
Energy investments 1990-2020 2020-2050 1990-2020 2020-2050 1990-2020 2020-2050 
Cumulative in trillion 
US$(1990) 
OECD 8 10 7 10 5 4 
REFs 3 6 2 5 2 3 
DCs 9 18 15 6 II 
World 20 34 16 30 13 18 
As share of GDP ("lo) 
OECD I.I 0.8 I.I 0.9 0.7 0.4 
REFs 9.0 4.3 7.9 5.9 7.0 3.9 
DCs 3.7 2.3 3.6 2.8 2.9 1.8 
World 1.9 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.5 I.I 
Per unit of primary energy 
US$(1990)/toe 
OECD 50 49 51 60 46 42 
REFs 56 53 67 74 54 63 
DCs 44 49 40 51 42 48 
World 48 49 48 56 45 49 
' A I scenario. 
• Cl scenario. 
and returns on investment become sufficiently attractive, there seems no fundamental 
reason why the finance for energy investments should not be forthcoming. 
The availability of international financing will also be affected by how the interna-
tional trading regime develops. Case A (high growth) assumes a strong drive toward free 
trade; Case B (middle course) incorporates continuing trade barriers, but none that greatly 
affect energy trade; and Case C (ecologically driven) makes international trade conditional 
on satisfaction of sustainable development objectives and whether projects and technolo-
gies satisfy the emerging environmental standards. In Case A, therefore, financing is 
attracted to where there is political stability, relatively high returns on investment, and 
attractive growth prospects, regardless of the nature of political regimes . Political consid-
erations and regional bloc trading regimes have their greatest influence in Case B. Financ-
ing of approved technologies and environmentally sound energy sources and schemes is 
not a problem in Case C, but other investments would be heavily regulated. 
Table 7 provides the study's estimate for cumulative investments in energy supply 
and conversion by region and by scenario, for the periods 1990 to 2020 and 2020 to 2050. 
These estimates, by convention, include capital for production capacity, for transmis-
sion and distribution infrastructures, and for complying with environmental standards. 
They do not include investments in end-use technologies, which are traditionally counted 
as durable consumer goods or business investments. However, the fact that the perfor-
mance of end-use technologies plays such an important role in all cases and scenarios 
in the study, suggests the need for a new approach in evaluating energy sector investments . 
Integrated resource planning, for example, has begun to extend the traditional energy 
perspective to take into account investments in end-use technologies. 
Between 2020 and 2050, capital requirements grow substantially in absolute terms but 
still more slowly than GDP in all scenarios. There is a shift from supply-side investments 
(included in Table 7) to end-use technology and infrastructure investments (which are 
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excluded). If the latter had been included in the table, the numbers are likely to have 
been greater by at least 50%. There are also advances along the technological learning 
curve and continued improvements in energy intensity that are reflected in the figures of 
the study (and that tend to reduce future investment needs markedly) . 
The results given in Table 7 indicate a range of cumulative capital requirements 
between 1990 and 2020 of US$13 to 20 x 1012 ($1990). For comparison, the latter figure 
equals the world GDP of the year 1990. The developing region's share rises sharply from 
today's 25% to 300Jo to between 42% and 48%, and becomes the largest energy capital 
investment market in all three cases. Considering energy investments as a share of macro-
region GDP, the transitional economies rank the highest with 70Jo to 9% of regional 
GDP devoted to energy investments. Obsolete energy structures and slow economic revival 
are the background. Developing countries invest 30Jo to 40Jo of GDP in the energy sector, 
and the OECD region invests about 1 OJo. 
Annual capital requirements rise from less than US$400 x 109 in 1990 to US$500 
to 750 x 109 (US$1990) by 2020, and to US$700 to 1200 x 109 (US$1990) by 2050. A 
large share of this investment will still need to be externally financed. 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS 
Three kinds of environmental impacts have been considered in the study (and are 
addressed in more detail in the main study report [l ]): local impacts of indoor and urban 
air pollution in developing countries; regional impacts of sulphur and nitrogen emissions 
and their potential contribution to acidification; and greenhouse gas emissions, particu-
larly C02, and their potential contribution to enhanced global warming. 
Local Impacts 
There are two important categories oflocal pollution. First, that arising from poverty, 
such as poor sanitation, polluted water, high levels of indoor air pollution caused by 
burning traditional fuels-impacting with particular severity on women, children, and 
the elderly- and high concentrations of particulate matter in urban areas. Second, pollu-
tion of modern origins resulting from dense motorized traffic and from low-efficiency 
coal combustion in electricity-generating plants, industrial premises , and homes. Concen-
trations of suspended particulate matter, lead, volatile organic compounds, tropospheric 
ozone, and sulphur dioxide widely exceed World Health Organization guidelines, particu-
larly in urban areas. 
The study reaches the following conclusions: 
• Improving conversion efficiencies in end-use devices has a key roie to play in 
conserving traditional resources such as fuelwood and reducing indoor air pol-
lution. 
• Structural shifts away from traditional energy end-use patterns and energy carriers 
toward more efficient modern conversion technologies and cleaner energy carriers 
are urgently necessary . 
• There will need to be a long-term shift toward energy services provided through 
clean, grid-dependent fuels. 
Environmental constraints, together with increasing affluence, are expected to lead 
to a long-term convergence of energy end-use systems and infrastructures in the direction 
of convenient and clean energy forms across the scenarios presented here, despite diverging 
energy supply structures. Local solutions to local problems need to come forward, appro-
priate in nature and scale to local circumstances, until the more long-term structural 
changes toward clean energy end-use carriers yield noticeable effects on improvements 
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in local environmental quality. There are variations among the scenarios in their environ-
mental impacts, however; Scenario A2 and Case B- both relatively coal intensive- arouse 
the gravest concern. 
Regional Impacts 
Energy emissions of sulphur dioxide (S02) and nitrogen oxides (NO,) have both local 
and regional impacts. Acid deposition is of particular concern. 
IIASA's RAINS model [12, 13] was used to calculate unabated scenarios of sulphur 
deposition in Europe and in South and East Asia. The analysis was carried out for the 
coal-intensive Scenario A2 and for the Case C scenarios. 
In Scenario A2, in the absence of sulphur abatement, sulphur emissions in Europe 
would increase by approximately 50% over the next 30 years. Sulphur deposition would 
exceed 16 gS/m2 per year in large areas of Central, Western, and Northern Europe. This 
contrasts to the requirements of the Second Sulphur Protocol on Transboundary Air 
Pollution of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, which calls for 
reduction measures to lower maximum excess deposition to below 3 gS/m2 per year. 
In the rapidly growing economies of Asia, the situation is even more dramatic. In 
the unabated Scenario A2,S02 emissions in South and East Asia triple by 2020 in the 
absence of abatement measures. It should be noted that the implications of current na-
tional energy projections exceed even this pessimistic scenario. 
In the unabated Scenario A2, ambient air quality in South and East Asia deteriorates 
significantly in both urban and rural areas, with sulphur deposition reaching double the 
worst levels ever observed in the most polluted areas of Central and Eastern Europe. 
Deposition exceeds the critical loads for most of the ecosystems in the region, where 
critical loads are defined as the maximum deposition levels at which ecosystems can 
function sustainably. The significance of these findings is that, in the absence of emissions 
abatement, critical loads for economically important food crops in Asia under Scenario 
A2 are expected to be exceeded by factors up to 10. 
Given these results, the scenarios of the study all incorporate only advanced coal 
technology, including scrubbers for new electricity generation capacity. Sulphur emissions 
are, therefore, significantly lower than in the unabated case. For Case A, European 
emissions in 2020 are between 13 and 15 million tons of S02 compared to 30 million tons 
in the unabated case. For Asia, Case A emissions in 2020 range from 25 to 45 million 
ton of S02, compared to more than 80 million ton for the unabated case. 
Further emission reductions are feasible but would require substantial additional 
investment requirements in the Case A scenarios. For the Case C scenarios, energy demand 
is much lower due to conservation efforts and much less sulphur-containing fossil fuel 
is used. This would keep the growth of unabated S02 in Asia over the next two decades 
below a factor of 2. Consequently, less stringent abatement measures are required and 
could be focused more economically on specific local hot spots. Overall, sulphur emissions 
in Case C can be kept at, or slightly below, 1990 levels with control costs under half 
those required in Scenario A2. 
These results indicate that in Asia concerns about sulphur emissions, and their poten-
tial regional impacts on food security, will take precedence over global, long-term environ-
mental issues such as potential climate change. Nitrogen emissions are likely to have 
much the same relative priority. 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
The study concentrated on future C02 emissions, as the dominant greenhouse gas, 
for each of the six scenarios as implied by their level of energy consumption and structure 
of energy supply. Figure 9 shows the results. 
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Fig. 9. Global energy-related carbon emissions, 1850 to 1990, and for three scenario families to 
2100, in GtC. 
C02 emissions vary substantially among the scenarios. In the coal-intensive Scenario 
A2, they reach 22 GtC (gigaton elemental carbon) in 2100, in Scenario Al 15 GtC, but 
in Scenario A3 significant structural change in the energy system reduces the figure to 7 
GtC. The latter is about the same level as current global energy-related carbon emissions, 
yet the energy consumption would have risen five-fold. Case B's emissions are comparable 
to those of Scenario A3 up to 2050 but are nearly double by 2100. The two scenarios 
of Case C were constrained to stabilize emissions at current levels again by 2050, in order 
to achieve an emission ceiling of 2 GtC (one-third their current level) by 2100. 
The resulting cumulative carbon emissions, considered of particular relevance for 
potential climate change, from the study are compared in Table 8 to earlier WEC scenarios 
[2] and to comparable emission scenarios of the IPCC [14, 15]. 
In contrast to many other scenarios, which combine optimism about high economic 
growth with pessimism about technological change, resource availability (except for coal 
production), and efficiency improvements, the scenarios presented here offer a more con-
sistent range of possible futures. 
The atmospheric C02 concentrations and surface temperature warming that might 
result from the scenario emissions were calculated using a carbon cycle and climate model 
developed by Wigley [16]. Figure 10 provides the results of the model used for atmospheric 
C02 concentration for the six scenarios. By 2100, the two Case C scenarios achieve an 
atmospheric C02 concentration below 420 ppmv (parts per million by volume); Case B 
is below 580 ppmv; and the three Case A scenarios are below 520 ppmv (A3), 610 ppmv 
(Al), and 730 ppmv (A2). Thus, only Scenario A2 exceeds the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change's preferred scenario, IS92a. 
There are considerable uncertainties surrounding the implications of such concentra-
tion increases for temperature change (as indicated for Case B in Figure 10). For the 
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TABLE 8 
Cumulative Emissions 1990-2100 (GtC): IPCC and WEC Scenarios Compared' 
IPCC/ IS92 emissions scenarios a 1,500 
b l.430 
e 2,190 
WEC Cases "Energy for Tomorrow's World," 1993 A 1,425 
B 1,130 
c 625 
llASA and WEC Cases "Long-Term Energy Perspectives," 1995 A2 1,720 
Al 1,350 
A3 980 
B 1,190 
Cl 590 
C2 580 
' On comparable world population assumptions (UN medium projection). 
Case C scenarios, global mean surface temperature rise at 2100 might be less than l.5°C 
from today's level; the Case A scenarios and Case B about + 2.0 to + 2.5°C. 
These results indicate that, if the current state of knowledge about the radiative 
forcing due to anthropogenic activities is well-founded, the energy sector is indeed a 
major stake holder. Even in the Case C scenarios, the energy sector would account for 400Jo 
of all long-term changes in radiative forcing (including agriculture and deforestation). In 
Scenario A3, the corresponding figure is 500Jo and in Scenario A2 80%. 
Conclusions 
All six scenarios analyzed in the study outline the following convergent and pervasive 
developments: increasing demand for energy services together with population growth 
and economic development; increasing quality and environmental compatibility of final 
energy forms; a shift in the global balance of economic activity and energy use from 
North to South; and the availability and reliance on fossil fuels for many decades to come. 
Technological progress and appropriate investment to match energy sources to the 
desire for more flexible, convenient, and clean forms of energy required to service con-
sumer needs are of crucial importance, but several decades of turnover of capital stock 
will be required to achieve that match. In the meantime, unless the long-term goal is 
itself matched by the appropriate policies and investment decisions, it will become even 
harder and more costly to change course. Investment decisions to 2020 are, therefore, an 
important concern -and not simply because of the tremendous sums of money involved. 
Assumptions made elsewhere, that high energy demand growth and limited techno-
logical and financial progress are consistent, are questioned in the study. Strict interna-
tional environmental policy measures (including limits on C02 emissions) and policies 
to promote international equity (ecologically driven-Case C) prove also consistent with 
substantial economic growth and energy development. Although individual countries or 
sectors may suffer from constraints, the overall result can be a positive sum game, and 
potential losses can be reduced or averted by strategies to diversify out of activities in 
long-run decline. 
All scenarios show, for instance, that the international oil and natural gas industries 
are still far from being half-way through their life cycle in terms of volumes extracted 
and used; even for coal, the most hostile scenarios indicate a prospective lifetime of 
several decades. 'r°hus, all three cases, all six scenarios, reflect substantial growth for all 
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energy industries to at least 2020. The coming decades will see much reshuffling within 
and among energy sectors. Many new business opportunities will arise linked to cleaner 
and more convenient fuels, to liquid rather than solid fuels, to grid and other intercon-
nected supplies, and to more locally appropriate- often small-scale- energy sources and 
conversion technologies. 
However, the scenarios indicate prospects will diverge after 2020, with different 
energy industries embarked on often mutually exclusive development paths. Coal, despite 
its huge resource base, could be particularly threatened-due to increased competition 
from other energy sources and due to environmental constraints. By contrast, the oil 
industry, and the natural gas industry to an even greater extent, have a long future ahead. 
New markets will have to be developed for traditional fuels, recognizing that the shift 
from selling energy to marketing energy services will continue and intensify. 
The central message across all six scenarios is that energy end-use patterns are con-
verging toward cleaner, more flexible, and more convenient energy forms, whereas energy 
systems structures are diverging as a result of emerging opportunities and the availability 
of policy choices. Although the structural changes in the near term will be modest, the 
seeds of long-term changes need to be initiated now. The near-term investments embodied 
in both capital stock and knowledge (research and development, and technology) will 
shape which of the divergent long-term alternatives will be taken and which ones will 
be precluded. 
The study has identified patterns that are robust across a purposely broad range of 
scenarios. It has also identified the conditions under which energy systems structures 
diverge into alternative directions. But no analysis can ever turn an uncertain future into 
a sure thing. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Methodology 
Reproducibility of results adds to their validity. This is especially the case when presenting long-term 
scenarios for which there are no established, rigorous validity proofs. A necessary-though not sufficient-
condition for reproducibility is a good description of the methods that produced the results. This appendix 
presents a summary description of the methods used in the study and references where more complete 
descriptions can be found. 
The analysis started with two principal exogenous variables: population growth by region and per 
capita economic growth by region . Levels of primary and final energy consumption were derived using 
a model developed at IIASA labeled simply Scenario Generator (SG) [17). It is essentially a combination 
of an extensive database of historical data on national economies and their energy systems and empirically 
estimated equations of past economic and energy developments . 
For each of the scenarios, the SG generated plausible future paths of energy use consistent with 
hi storical data and with the specific features that were specified for the scenarios, e.g., high or moderate 
economic growth, rapid or more gradual energy intensity improvements, technological development across 
the board, or high development in green technologies and slower development for fossil fuels. 
Two other models were then used in an iterative mode for testing for consistency among all the pieces 
of each scenario . A model of energy-economy interactions called l lR was used to check for consistency 
between a region's macroeconomic development and its energy use. l lR is a modified version of Global 
2100, originally published in 1992 [18) and subsequently used widely in energy studies throughout the 
world . IIASA's energy supply model called MESSAGE Ill provided detailed estimates of energy demand 
and supply [19, 20) . MESSAGE Ill is a dynamic linear optimization model calculating cost-minimal 
supply structures under the constraints of resource availability, the menu of given technologies, and the 
demand for useful energy. Both models use a discount rate of 50Jo per a_nnum. The two models are used 
in tandem because they correspond to the two different perspectives from which energy modeling is usually 
done : top down ( 11 R) and bottom up (MESSAGE Ill). The model-linking methodology is described in [21). 
The regional acidification impacts were calculated using IIASA's RAINS model [ 12, 13) . It is a modular 
simulation model with sections to calculate : (!) emissions from given levels of activity in the energy 
sector and energy end uses; (2) subsequent atmospheric transport and chemical transformations of those 
emissions; (3) deposition; and (4) ecological impacts. The latter are calculated based on a spatial resolution 
of grid cells of 150 km side length. 
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The impacts of energy biomass production on land use and potential conflicts with food production 
were calculated using llASA's basic linked system (BLS) of national agricultural models [22, 23]. BLS 
consists of sectorially disaggregated macroeconomic models with detailed agricultural production func-
tions that account for all major inputs (land, fertilizer , capital, and labor) required for the production 
of 11 agricultural commodities. 
AFR 
BLS 
bbl 
co, 
C02DB 
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APPENDIX 2 
Acronyms 
Basic linked system model, IIASA 
Barrels (oil equivalent, I toe = 7 bbl) 
Carbon dioxide 
IIASA carbon dioxide mitigation technology database 
Centrally planned Asia and China 
Commercial primary energy 
Developing countries 
Central and Eastern Europe 
Former Soviet Union 
Gross domestic product 
GDP at market exchange rates 
GDP at purchasing power parities exchange rates 
Gross national product 
Giga [billion ( 109)] ton of carbon 
Giga [billion (H>9)] ton oil equivalent 
Gross world product 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
Industrialized countries (OECD plus REFs) 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
Kilograms oil equivalent 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
Middle East and North Africa 
Model for energy supply strategy alternatives and their general environmental impacts, IIASA 
Megawatt 
Million (106) tons oil equivalent 
Market exchange rate 
North America 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
Pacific OECD 
Other Pacific Asia 
Primary energy 
Parts per million by volume 
Purchasing power parities 
Regional acidification information and simulation model, IIASA 
Reforming economies (EEU plus FSU) 
South Asia 
Scenario Generator model, IIASA 
Sulphur dioxide 
Total primary energy 
United Nations 
United Nations Development Programme 
World Energy Council 
Western Europe 
World Health Organization 
11 world regions macroeconomic energy model, IIASA 
